Re: [boost] [Boost-users] [xint] Boost.XInt formal review

Subject: Re: [boost] [Boost-users] [xint] Boost.XInt formal review
From: Marsh Ray (marsh_at_[hidden])
Date: 2011-03-03 00:50:16

On 03/02/2011 07:31 PM, Scott McMurray wrote:
>
> I'm not convinced that either of those answers are correct, since
> neither prevents the OS from swapping the memory to disk while it
> contains secret data.

(Or your cloud provider from migrating your whole OS image across a 
network.)

> To me, it seems that Boost isn't the place for anything that claims to
> be "secure", since the community is unsufficiently skilled in
> interpretive dance: see
> <http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html>,
> or specifically
> <http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Zfbv3mHcYrc/Sre5JqBKZyI/AAAAAAAABn8/Op-n-e0JVaA/s1600-h/aes_act_3_scene_02_agreement_1100.png>
> :)

+1

There are some not-entirely-unheard of operating systems that emit 
detectable patterns from /dev/random. Libraries like OpenSSL dedicate 
large amounts of code to secure random generation for this sort of 
reason. But they're still vulnerable to a Debian maintainer changing 
something he doesn't understand.

The RSA example is a great way to demonstrate bigint libraries - and a 
terrible thing to actually use it for.

I suggest any wording suggesting "cryptographically secure" be avoided. 
Even dedicated purpose cryptographic libraries written and maintained by 
experts are still weeding out the tiny bugs and timing and cache 
side-channel attacks years later.

- Marsh