Re: [boost] [Boost-users] [xint] Boost.XInt formal review

Subject: Re: [boost] [Boost-users] [xint] Boost.XInt formal review
From: Christopher Jefferson (chris_at_[hidden])
Date: 2011-03-03 10:30:36

On 3 Mar 2011, at 15:14, Chad Nelson wrote:

> On Wed, 2 Mar 2011 17:31:07 -0800
> Scott McMurray <me22.ca+boost_at_[hidden]> wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Mar 2, 2011 at 06:16, Christopher Jefferson
>> <chris_at_[hidden]> wrote:
>> 
>>> The 'secure' flag at the moment I believe cannot be trusted to work.
>>> Compilers can, and do, optimise out memset if it can prove the
>>> memory will not be changed again. [...]
>> 
>> I'm not convinced that either of those answers are correct, since
>> neither prevents the OS from swapping the memory to disk while it
>> contains secret data.
> 
> A known and documented problem:
> <http://www.oakcircle.com/xint_docs/structboost_1_1xint_1_1options_1_1secure.html>
> 
>> To me, it seems that Boost isn't the place for anything that claims to
>> be "secure", since the community is unsufficiently skilled in
>> interpretive dance: see
>> <http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html>,
>> or specifically
>> <http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Zfbv3mHcYrc/Sre5JqBKZyI/AAAAAAAABn8/Op-n-e0JVaA/s1600-h/aes_act_3_scene_02_agreement_1100.png>
>> :)
> 
> Perhaps an alternate name for that option, then. One that wouldn't be
> too much longer or too many words, but also wouldn't be misinterpreted
> as providing true security... perhaps more_secure? It requires a little
> less typing, and is less frightening, than less_insecure. ;-)

Yes, of course there are other problems, such as timing attacks ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack ) , which xint does not, and should not, try to stop.

Chris