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Subject: Re: [boost] [Beast] Security issue note
From: Artyom Beilis (artyom.beilis_at_[hidden])
Date: 2017-06-28 05:25:25

On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 12:30 AM, Vinnie Falco via Boost
<boost_at_[hidden]> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 1:40 PM, Artyom Beilis via Boost
> <boost_at_[hidden]> wrote:
>> Looking into parser/body code I noticed:
>> ...
>> Basically I can exhaust the memory of the server and kill it by
>> providing huge content length from several connections and lead to its
>> crash.
>> Reasonable and configurable limit should be provided for content length.
> That's reasonable although note that you can put a max buffer size on
> the dynamic buffers that come with Beast, and it will naturally take
> care of limits. For example:
> beast::http::request<beast::http::dynamic_body> req{1024 * 1024};
> will create a request that has a 1MB limit on the body. The moment the
> reader goes to resize the dynamic buffer, it will return a
> beast::http::error::buffer_overflow error.

It does not fix security flaw of using http::string_body!

> Still, your suggestion to add something like `void
> basic_parser::max_content_length(std::size_t)` is a good idea. Thanks!

Note: the default and reasonable max_context_length must be defined by default.

std::size_t isn't good for max_content_length, it should be unsigned long long
or uint64_t because if you use it for file upload on 32 bit system you want to
support files above 4GB.


Artyom Beilis

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