Re: Boost.Random

From: degski (degski_at_[hidden])
Date: 2020-06-17 21:11:07

On Wed, 17 Jun 2020 at 15:52, degski <degski_at_[hidden]> wrote:

> I have a *PoC* of a sax::aes_random_device at
> https://github.com/degski/aes_random_device .
>
> It is a PoC and also needs research, it is undoubtedly much better than
> mt19937, and on Windows/MSVC is faster (~30%) than std::mt19937. The
> Crypto-claim needs more code and research related to
> backtracking-resistance ...
>

The back-tracking resistance is only relevant in a cryptographic context
where the [this] CPRNG is under attack, with if I understood it well,
unlimited access to streams [blocks] of data and unlimited time [as an
assumption, i.e. somebody using a data-centre to actively crack a CPRNG].

The CPRNG is fully seeded with std::random_device, whereafter the device
needs no more entropy, it is 'spreading out' that initial entropy. The
entropy is massive as compared to a PRNG (mt19937 a.o.).

degski